Selasa, 17 Mei 2011

Udinese Selling Their Way To The Top


Following back-to-back victories against Lazio and Chievo Verona, Udinese stand on the brink of achieving the improbable dream of qualifying for the Champions League for only the second time in their history. They only need one more point to guarantee their entrance through the “gates of paradise”, as Europe’s flagship competition was described by their down-to-earth coach Francesco Guidolin, but the last game of the season is against this year’s champions Milan, so this objective is still far from a fait accompli.

For a self-professed small club from the provinces, this would be a notable feat, especially as they only finished in 15th place last season and started this year’s campaign with four consecutive defeats, languishing in last place after six games. Before the season kicked-off, most pundits had predicted mid-table as the height of their aspirations, but Udinese’s free-flowing brand of attacking football (only Inter have scored more goals so far this season) has brought them many new admirers, as well as the record number of points in Serie A for Le Zebrette (little zebras).

Indeed, the venerated owner Giampaolo Pozzo proudly stated, “We play the best football in Italy”, a claim that was difficult to argue with after a series of scintillating performances, including an astonishing 7-0 win against Palermo (in Sicily), a thrilling 4-4 away draw against Milan and a richly deserved 3-1 victory against Inter. This is all the more impressive as Udinese are a young team of many nationalities with players emanating from all over the globe.

"Cristian Zapata - Colombia's finest"

Thus, the team that overcame Chievo featured four South Americans, most obviously the brilliant Chilean Alexis Sánchez, but also the pacy wing-backs, Mauricio Isla (also from Chile) and the Colombian Pablo Armero, plus the formidable centre-half Cristián Zapata (also from Colombia).

It also included two players from the African continent: midfielder Kwadwo Asamoah, who played every match for Ghana in the 2010 World Cup, and the Moroccan international Mehdi Benatia. Finally, the team contained three Europeans from smaller nations: the new Swiss captain, hard-working midfielder, Gökhan Inler, and his compatriot Almen Abdi, plus the coveted Slovenian goalkeeper, Samir Handanovič, who recently tied the league record of saving six penalties during the course of one season.

However, the bandiera of the team is the captain Antonio “Totò” Di Natale, who has been at the club since 2004, resisting all overtures to move away, including an offer last summer from Juventus. He was the top scorer in Serie A last season with an incredible 29 goals, an exploit that he is almost certain to repeat this season, as he is currently leading the capocannoniere charts with 28 goals.

"Toto Di Natale - not just for Christmas"

However, Pozzo has also paid tribute to the efforts of Guidolin, “Praise should be divided between him and the team. If you don’t have a great coach, nothing will be achieved.” After working minor miracles last year when he guided Parma to an unexpected 8th place in their first season back in the top flight, Guidolin somewhat surprisingly returned to Udinese for his second spell after a brief period in charge in 1998/99. As befitting the Friuli area, which is famous for its hard-working ethic (as epitomised by Fabio Capello), Guidolin’s motto for the team has been “humble but ambitious.” Nevertheless, after a distinctly unpromising start, Guidolin proved himself capable of making big decisions, when he “took a gamble” by moving the mercurial Sánchez from the wing to the middle, playing just behind Di Natale, which has turned out to be a masterstroke.

Despite being one of the oldest football clubs in Italy Udinese have never really won anything of note, though they do seem to have firmly established themselves in the top tier, having competed in Serie A for sixteen consecutive seasons, a record only matched by Milan, Inter, Lazio and Roma.

Furthermore, they have qualified for Europe eight times in the last 15 years, the highlight being when Luciano Spalletti’s team, built around the goals of Vincenzo Iaquinta and that man Di Natale, reached the Champions League in 2005, when they were eliminated at the group stages by a late goal from Barcelona. They also had a good run in the late 90s, when they qualified for the UEFA Cup four years in a row, initially under Alberto Zaccheroni, whose team was inspired by the prolific German striker Oliver Bierhoff. Most recently, Udinese got as far as the UEFA Cup quarter-finals in 2008/09 before being knocked-out by Werder Bremen.

"Giampaolo Pozzo - 25 years and counting"

The main man behind Udinese’s rise during this period has been the owner, Giampaolo Pozzo, an Italian businessman who bought the club at a difficult moment in 1986, when it was embroiled in a betting scandal, resulting in a nine-point penalty that meant relegation to Serie B.

History repeated itself in 1990, when the authorities imposed a four-point penalty after they deemed a phone call to Pozzo’s counterpart at Lazio on the eve of an important match as evidence of untoward activities. Since that time, Pozzo has relinquished his role as club president, leaving the day-to-day running to Franco Soldati and his son Gino, who has proved a veritable figlio d’arte (as the Italians say), following in his father’s footsteps to perfection. However, Giampaolo still very much remains the power behind the throne.

In the 90s Pozzo implemented a strategy that has become the envy of other clubs. Udinese have become famous for their skilled operations in the transfer market, especially their ability to find hidden talents all over the world, which they develop and later sell for large gains. The reputable Italian financial newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore approvingly described this business model as running “like a Swiss watch.”

In reality, Udinese have been forced to be innovative, as their budget is much lower than the leading Italian clubs. It is fair to say that Serie A is not easy for provincial clubs, as the likes of Milan, Inter, Juventus and Roma have traditionally benefited from substantial financing by industrialist owners and superior television and commercial deals. It is also difficult for the smaller clubs to attract Italian talent into their primavera, hence Udinese’s decision to cast their net further afield.

"Samir Handanovic - loves a penalty save"

The club set up a global scouting network of around 50 observers with hundreds more local contacts in order to identify the most promising young players before they had become fully established and attracted the attention of the larger clubs. Furthermore, they have focused on “alternative” markets in Africa and South America that are relatively unexploited in order to purchase youngsters at a reasonable price. They usually buy from second tier countries, examples being Chile and Colombia in South America (as opposed to Brazil and Argentina) and Switzerland and Slovenia in Europe.

This arrangement also works well for the players, who accept low salaries in return for further development, experience in one of Europe’s best leagues and the opportunity to put themselves in the shop window. Although Udinese’s policy of acting as a stepping stone for their best players may not make their fans happy, there’s no doubt that the profits from the regular sales makes a huge contribution to the club’s financial self-sufficiency.

The sensational Alexis Sánchez is a great example of how carefully Udinese nurture their talent. Although the club bought him as a precocious 16-year old talent in 2006, he did not arrive at Udinese until the summer of 2008, having been loaned out twice as part of the development process: initially to the Chilean club Colo Colo, then to River Plate in Argentina to give him experience abroad, but not too far from home.

"Guidolin - where did it all go right?"

Udinese have bolstered their strategy by forming a partnership with Granada, a club playing in the Spanish second division, where they loan youngsters that need playing time, such as the Ghanaian Jonathan Mensah. Given the Friuli club’s connections with the South American market, it is no coincidence that they opted for a club in a Spanish speaking country to park their players. In total, Granada currently have an amazing 14 players on loan from Udinese.

In fact, one of the logical results of Udinese’s approach is that they end up having an extremely large squad, so they absolutely need to loan out a vast number of players every season (earning them €3.6 million in 2010). Including the players at Granada, I make the current total 63, though I may well have lost count. This is the sort of “wheeler dealing” that makes Harry Redknapp look like a rank amateur.

The problem with all these ins and outs is that it makes it difficult for Udinese to progress to the next level, but their consistent presence in Serie A’s top ten over the years is ample proof of their ability to remain competitive despite the constant departures. It is strange to say, but they have effectively sold their way to the top without weakening their squad, as seen by this small club providing no fewer than eight players at last year’s World Cup: Di Natale, Sánchez, Isla, Asamoah, Inler, Handanovič, the Italian Simone Pepe (since loaned to Juventus) and the Serb Aleksandar Luković (since sold to Zenit St. Petersburg).

Of course, like every other club, Udinese’s record in the transfer market is not perfect and they have bought their fair share of duds (also suffering from a fake passport scandal in 2000), but overall their policy has been a solid money-maker. The scouting network reportedly costs €4 million a year, but this investment has produced some staggering financial results.

In the last decade, Udinese have received over €206 million from sales in the transfer market. Deducting purchases of €94 million during the same period gives net proceeds of an astonishing €112 million. In most years since 2005, there have been at least a couple of big money sales, including the likes of David Pizzarro (Inter), Marek Jankulovski (Milan), Per Krøldrup (Everton), Vincenzo Iaquinta (Juventus), Sulley Muntari (Portsmouth), Andrea Dossena (Liverpool), Asamoah Gyan (Rennes), Fabio Quagliarella (Napoli), and last summer, Gaetano D’Agostino and Felipe (both to Fiorentina). It’s a seemingly endless production line of players who were bought cheaply, but sold on for large sums.

Even as the transfer market stagnates elsewhere, Udinese have somehow managed to keep ahead of the others. Last year, their net sales were higher than any other club in Serie A, while the previous season they were only surpassed by Milan, thanks to the truly exceptional sale of Kaká to Real Madrid.

Over the last four years, their net proceeds of almost €60 million have been far ahead of other Italian clubs. In fact, only five other clubs had a net surplus in that period. To place Udinese’s performance into context, their net gains are higher than those other five clubs put together – that’s extraordinary.

And it’s not just the players who appreciate Udinese’s ability to develop individuals. Friuli has also proved to be an ideal environment for ambitious coaches with the two most eminent graduates in recent times being Luciano Spalletti, who has gone on to win the Russian League with Zenit St. Petersburg and the Coppa Italia with Roma, and Alberto Zaccheroni, who instantly delivered a scudetto to Milan.

The reason why Udinese are so concentrated on making money from player sales is immediately apparent when you look at how small their revenue is. Although it is the tenth highest in Italy at €41 million, leaving them in mid-table respectability (or mediocrity, depending which way you look at it) in the Serie A money league, it is streets behind the leading clubs. Last season, three clubs earned more than five times as much revenue: Inter €225 million, Milan €208 million and Juventus €205 million. Roma generate three times as much revenue at €123 million, while Fiorentina, Napoli and Lazio all have turnovers more than double that of Udinese.

This really puts Udinese’s performance this season into perspective, especially when you consider that a club with the same revenue, Sampdoria, has just been relegated. If they do manage to get into the Champions League, the gap to the leading European clubs becomes more like an abyss with clubs like Real Madrid and Barcelona earning ten times as much income.

This highlights the challenge that would face Udinese in Europe. As an example, when Sampdoria crashed out to Werder Bremen in the final qualifying round for the group stages, they were facing a team whose annual budget is two and a half times as high as their own. Another interesting comparative is that Udinese’s 2009/10 revenue was lower than every single club in the Premier League, so less than the likes of Burnley, Hull City and Portsmouth, who were all relegated to England’s second tier.

Other points stand out from the analysis of the revenue mix. Udinese get a very small proportion (9%) of their revenue from gate receipts with only two clubs having a lower percentage (Siena and Juventus). On the other hand, Udinese’s reliance on TV income is very high at 64%, even without European revenue.

The importance of player trading to Udinese’s business can be seen very well in the above graph. If profit on player sales is considered as “revenue”, its contribution has been notable in the past few years, averaging 35-40% of normal turnover since 2008. Put another way, the club makes six times as much from the transfer market as gate receipts. In fact, it makes almost twice as much from player sales as gate receipts and commercial income combined. This would be very worrying if Udinese had not shown that they are more than capable of maintaining this “revenue stream” year after year.

Of course, Udinese are not unique in their ability to generate profits on player sales, but they compare favourably to other clubs who are equally renowned in this area. For example, in the last three years Udinese made €78 million, which may be less than the €91 million earned by Lyon and €111 million earned by Porto in the same period, but in fairness those clubs do have a far higher spending capacity.

In spite of their low turnover, Udinese have managed to operate a sustainable model with cumulative net profits of €3 million over the last six years. After two years of solid profits in 2008 (€7.9 million) and 2009 (€6.9 million), the club did report a small loss of €6.9 million last year. There were a number of reasons for this decline: lower gate receipts, as there was no European competition in 2009/10, €1.5 million; increase in staff costs to strengthen the squad and a payment following the departure of former coach, Pasquale Marino, €4 million; lower profit from player sales, €7 million; and a €4 million tax payment on prior years’ profits.

Essentially, the profit and loss account reiterates the importance of profit on player sales, which is used to more or less balance the books. Obviously, whether this is sufficient depends on how much money is made from player trading. Last year, profit from player sales of €23.6 million was not enough to offset the €26.1 million operating loss, but in 2009 the higher profits on player sales of €30.9 more than compensated for the operating loss of €17.4 million.

Eagle-eyed financial observers may have noticed that the revenue figures used in my money League are lower than those used in the club’s own books. The reason for the difference is that Italian accounts report gross revenue, while I have shown net income, as this is consistent with the approach used in other countries. Therefore, I have excluded the following: (a) gate receipts given to visiting clubs €0.6 million; (b) TV income given to visiting clubs €4.3 million; (c) revenue from player loans €3.6 million. Adding the €8.5 million adjustments to the €40.8 million in my analysis gives the €49.3 million reported in Italy.

If we look at how Udinese compare to other clubs in terms of profit, a few points emerge. First, they are indeed one of the more profitable clubs with only five ahead of them over the last two years – when their result was a perfect example of how to break-even with an aggregate profit of exactly zero. Second, the significance of profit on player sales is yet again emphasised with only two clubs recording higher profit on player sales as a percentage of turnover (Parma and Genoa). Third, just look at the size of the losses made in then last two years by Inter €223 million and Milan €77 million.

Note that the profit on player sales used by La Gazzetta dello Sport are higher than mine, as they have only shown plusvalenze, leaving minusvalenze in costs. Very technical, but rest assured that the source data is identical.

By now, it should be abundantly clear to everyone that Udinese’s business model is hugely reliant on profit made by selling players, but, whisper it quietly, the winds of change may just be blowing at Udinese. Last week, Giampaolo Pozzo spoke of three factors that might grow the club’s resources outside its traditional prowess in the transfer market, namely the Champions League, television money and a renovated stadium. If these plans come to fruition, Udinese may be able to modify its celebrated strategy and hang on to its stars.

"Mauricio Isla - Udinese's other Chilean"

Along with his son Gino, he understands that for Udinese to grow, the club’s approach needs to be fine-tuned with more emphasis on other revenue streams. That does not mean that Udinese will totally jettison their “buy low, sell high” strategy, not least because they’re so damn good at it, but it does suggest that they realise that they need to do more financially to advance to the next level. As the owner put it, “We are fighting with the dagger between our teeth for the last slice of the TV money. Then, there’s the plan to improve the stadium. And Europe brings higher earnings.” Obviously, this will not be easy, but let’s look at each of these potential growth areas in turn.

Reaching the Champions League would be the biggest game changer. Last time Udinese qualified in 2005/06, they received around €12 million revenue: €9 million from UEFA’s central distribution (participation fees, prize money and TV income) and €3 million additional gate receipts. However, the sums available these days are considerably higher with the four Italian qualifiers last season earning an average of €29 million (Inter €49 million, Milan €24 million, Fiorentina €22 million and Juventus €21 million).

It’s also worth noting that while the Europa League would help boost funds, it is nowhere near as rewarding as the Champions League with last season’s three Italian representatives (Roma, Lazio and Genoa) only earning around €2 million each. Indeed, the team that actually wins the Europa League, having played countless matches, only receives €6.4 million. Udinese are well aware of this fact, having earned just €1.2 million from their UEFA Cup adventure in 2008/09, and Pozzo has spoken of the “big difference” between the two competitions, so it is very worthwhile securing that fourth place.

"Celebrate the good times"

The importance of qualification to Udinese’s plans has been underlined by the owner’s recent announcements. First, he said, “With the Champions, I would like to keep Sánchez and the other family jewels” and then went a stage further, “If we get into the Champions, then I will buy.”

Of course, they’re not there yet and have two more hurdles to clear. First, they have to cement their position in Serie A, taking at least a point from Milan, but this would only qualify them for the Champions League play-off round and they could face a very tricky tie to reach the lucrative group stage. Just look how close Spurs came to disaster in their match against the Swiss minnows, Young Boys Bern, before finally squeaking through.

The other obvious point is that it will be really hard for Udinese to qualify for the Champions League on a regular basis, especially as Italy will lose one of their four places from 2011/12, now the Bundesliga has overtaken Serie A in UEFA’s table of coefficients. In such an eventuality, Udinese would have to cope with a dramatic reduction in funds, as happened to them in 2007, when their revenue fell by more than a third from €44 million to €28 million, turning a €6.5 million profit into a €6.3 million loss.

Udinese’s domestic TV deal was worth around €26 million last season, having risen in 2008 when the new contract was introduced, but this pales into insignificance compared to the €90-100 million that Juventus, Milan and Inter have been earning from their individual deals. These vast differences have meant that the playing field in Italy has been anything but level, but years of protest finally led to a new collective agreement being implemented at the beginning of this season. We know that the total money guaranteed by exclusive media rights partner Infront Sports will be approximately 20% higher than before at over €1 billion a year, but it is still unclear what the impact will be on each club’s revenue.

There is a complicated distribution formula, which will still favour the bigger clubs, though there is likely to be a reduction at the top end. Under the new regulations, 40% will be divided equally among the 20 Serie A clubs; 30% is based on past results (5% last season, 15% last 5 years, 10% from 1946 to the sixth season before last); and 30% is based on the population of the club’s city (5%) and the number of fans (25%).

The larger clubs will lose out from the new arrangement, but the mid-tier clubs like Udinese will benefit. There is still a question over how the number of fans (worth 25% of the deal) will be calculated, leading to a major dispute between the larger clubs (represented by Milan, Inter, Juventus, Roma and Napoli) and the smaller clubs (represented by Udinese, Parma, Sampdoria, Palermo and Catania), even over which market research companies to use. Pozzo is at the forefront of this battle, as he understands the importance of the decision to the revenue of clubs like his. Whatever the final ruling, it seems reasonably certain that Udinese’s TV revenue will grow – the only question is by how much.

However, Udinese’s real Achilles heel, like so many Italian clubs, is their paltry match day income. Last season’s gate receipts of €3.6 million were exactly the same as the amount Manchester United generate in a single match at Old Trafford. In fact, the so-called theatre of dreams took in €122 million of match day income last season, which is an incredible 34 times as much as Udinese.

That is partly explained by Udinese’s ongoing struggle to attract spectators. In fact, last season’s average attendance of 17,356 was only the 13th highest in Serie A. Given the relatively small size of Udine (population 175,000), that’s perhaps not overly surprising, but it’s hardly conducive to financial stability at a football club. This also underlines the club’s need to work the transfer market, as the profit from one good player sale (€8 million) is the equivalent of Udinese tripling their gate receipts.

Nevertheless, the club has announced plans to renovate the Stadio Friuli, though interestingly the work will actually reduce the stadium’s capacity from the current (restricted) 30,667 to a more realistic 22,000. Although one objective is to increase revenue, the underlying objective is to make the stadium a “theatre of football”, which will be more attractive to local fans and tempt the crowds back. Pozzo explained, “We don’t want a cathedral in the desert.”

"Design for life"

The initial plans were for a multi-purpose development, including restaurants, hotels, gyms and a commercial area, but this met with opposition from existing concerns. Instead, the local council has in principle approved a modern, two tier stadium with all seats fully covered and the athletics track eliminated, bringing the spectators closer to the pitch, the inspirations being the Stadio Luigi Ferraris in Genoa and the Stadio Dino Manuzzi in Cesena.

There will be more hospitality areas and the club will be allowed to stage a number of events, such as music concerts and rugby matches, which will generate additional revenue, but this is not likely to be significant in my opinion. There has been no mention to date of any naming rights.

Unlike Juventus, the “new” stadium will not belong to the club, but continue to be owned by the council. In return for Udinese paying all the construction costs, which are estimated to be around €25 million, the council will give the club a 65-year lease and reduce the annual rent, which is currently €200,000 a year. The other condition that Pozzo has imposed is that the building work must commence this summer, so that the new stadium is ready in time for the start of the 2013/14 season.

It had been hoped that the new stadium would be used for Euro 2016, but that tournament has now been awarded to France. UEFA’s minimum capacity for hosting such international events is 34,000, but the plans allow for the Stadio Friuli’s capacity to be increased at a later date by adding a third tier if necessary.

There is also room for growth in the club’s commercial revenue, which actually slightly decreased in 2010 to €11.1 million, one of the lowest in Serie A. The shirt sponsorship deal with Rumanian car manufacturer Dacia (owned by Renault) was extended two years in July 2009, but is only worth €1 million a season, a lot less than other Italian clubs: Milan – Emirates €12 million, Inter – Pirelli €9 million, Juventus – BetClic €8 million, Roma – Wind €7 million, Napoli – Acqua Lete €5.5 million and Fiorentina – Mazda €4 million.

Those clubs also receive higher sums from their kit suppliers than the €1.1 million Udinese get from Lotto Sports (Inter – Nike €18 million, Milan – Adidas €13 million, Juventus – Nike €12 million, Roma – Kappa €5 million and Napoli – Macron €4.7 million). However, one of the indirect benefits of qualifying for the Champions League is higher commercial income, as sponsors see greater exposure.

Given the low revenue, the club has admitted that it is under “continual pressure to contain costs”, which effectively means the wage bill. Udinese have done a reasonable job here with wages rising in line with revenue since 2005, both with growth around 55%. The problem is that as the turnover is so small, even a minor increase in the wages has an inordinate impact on the important wages to turnover ratio, e.g. a €4 million rise in 2010 caused this ratio to worsen from 58% to 71%.

Nevertheless, Udinese’s wage bill of €31 million is still one of the smallest in Serie A and looks utterly insignificant compared to those of the “big four”, who appear to be playing in a different league altogether: Inter €234 million, Milan €172 million, Juventus €138 million and Roma €101 million. This is a double-edged sword for the club: on the one hand, it’s financially prudent, but on the other hand it makes it difficult to hold on to players. Then again, given Udinese’s high reliance on profits from player sales, maybe this is not an issue.

Only one player at Udinese, Di Natale, receives more than €1 million annual salary with the next highest paid being Sánchez €0.7 million and Zapata €0.65 million. Totó’s value looks even better, if you consider that he has scored exactly twice as many goals this season as Zlatan Ibrahimović, who is on €9 million a year.

Bonus payments can also have an impact on successful clubs, but Udinese’s players have apparently only been promised €3 million in total if they remain in the top four, described as a “cherry on the cake.”

Player amortisation, the cost of writing down transfer fees over the length of a player’s contract, is not that high at €14 million, but this is material when your turnover is only €44 million. Indeed, the increase in 2007 was noted in the accounts as one of the reasons for that year’s loss.

Udinese’s net debt has been steadily increasing in the last four years and now stands at €36 million after deducting €1 million cash. This includes €13 million bank loans and €24 million from a factoring arrangement with Unicredit. Although the bank loans are clearly not excessive, it is worth noting that only three Italian clubs have higher balances: Milan €164 million, Inter €71 million and Juventus €33 million.

This is nothing to really worry about, especially as Udinese have net balances owed to them on transfer fees of €24 million, made up of €28 million owed to other clubs and a hefty €52 million owed by other clubs. Given the way that Italian clubs do business with many stage payments, this is by no means unusual, but the fact that the balances are so high is a direct result of Udinese’s buying and selling strategy. There shouldn’t be any major issues here, though the exception that proves the rule was the dispute with Portsmouth over money owed for Muntari.

In fact, Udinese has one of the strongest balance sheets in Serie A with net assets of €38 million, only behind Fiorentina and Juventus. This fine achievement is actually under-stated, as the players are only valued at €48 million in the accounts, while the respected Transfermarkt website has estimated that a more realistic market value would be in the order of €111 million. No wonder Pozzo allowed himself to proclaim, “Fortunately the club is in the best of (financial) health.”

So what of the future?

In the accounts, the club confidently expects a “positive result” for 2010/11, based on the new collective TV rights deal and (stop me if you’ve heard this one before) “notable” profits on player sales in the 2010 summer window – already higher than the total achieved in the whole of 2009/10.

"Gokhan Inler - Swiss efficiency"

Nevertheless, other clubs will inevitably still apply pressure on Udinese to sell their talented players this summer. There would be no shortage of suitors for Sánchez, including Barcelona and Manchester United, though Manchester City are understood to be in pole position with a reported bid of €35-40 million. In some ways, although no club would want to lose a player of his calibre, this would be the ultimate vindication of the Udinese strategy, as they only paid €3 million for the little maestro. Even Guidolin admitted, “He is destined to join a top club, considering the quality he has shown for some time.”

At least a deal of this magnitude would mean that Udinese would have no need to sell any of the other players, though Asamoah, Inler and Zapata are all in demand. For the moment, Pozzo is holding firm, “Our wish is to strengthen the squad, but it’s up to the players. However, this time nobody wants to leave.” Furthermore, the players’ values should go up if they perform well in the Champions league.

Those may be the words of an astute salesman, but, as we have seen, Udinese should soon have more money from other sources. Pozzo again: “I know we are regarded as a selling club, but now things have changed, as the money in Italy will no longer just go into the pockets of the usual 4-5 big clubs.”

"Happy days for Asamoah"

Longer-term the advent of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Rules should theoretically benefit well-run clubs like Udinese, but paradoxically it also poses two threats to their strategy. First, it could reduce the value of transfer fees, as clubs do not want to carry high amortisation costs – indeed, transfer spending was down almost 30% in Europe’s major leagues in 2010. Second, more clubs will try to emulate Udinese’s success at developing youth players, so the competition will become even more intense. This is why Udinese have started to invest in facilities to house teenagers, as they search for even younger players.

The chances are that Udinese will not completely abandon their successful buying and selling strategy, but changes to the TV rights in Italy, allied with their modernised stadium should add a few more strings to their bow. In the short-term, they can hope to further enhance their financial status by qualifying for the Champions League. What a present that would be for their respected owner, Giampaolo Pozzo, who celebrates his 70th birthday next week after 25 years at the club.


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Selasa, 10 Mei 2011

Lille's French Revolution


Although Lille’s faltering form in recent weeks has caused a few to doubt their ability to sustain their sparkling challenge in Ligue 1, this weekend’s victory over Nancy restored a four point lead at the top of the table. With just four games remaining until the end of the season, Les Dogues are well on course to win their first French title since 1954.

Even though this should not be too unexpected, given that Lille finished last season in fourth place (and were the league’s leading scorers), it is still somewhat of a surprise to see a small provincial side ahead of traditional powerhouses like Marseille and Lyon. Indeed, Lille are actually chasing a domestic double, as they face Paris Saint-Germain in the French Cup Final next Saturday at the Stade de France.

Their success has been built on an impressive attacking style of play, which once again has the Northern side leading the scoring charts, with the African combination of the powerful Moussa Sow and the pacy Gervinho netting 35 goals between them so far this season. The splendidly dreadlocked Gervinho made a distinct impression for the Ivory Coast at the World Cup in South Africa, but the Senegalese Sow has been transformed since arriving on a free transfer from Rennes last summer.

The hub of Lille’s progressive formation is comprised of a trio of diminutive midfielders, like a less lauded version of Barcelona, featuring French internationals, Rio Mavuba (the club captain) and Yohan Cabaye, plus the experienced Florent Balmont.

"Gervinho - more than a haircut"

However, the undoubted star of the show is the young Belgian winger Eden Hazard, who has been named Ligue 1’s most exciting young player in each of the last two seasons, and is being chased by virtually all of Europe’s leading clubs, as well as most French defences. This young man, as Ray Wilkins would inevitably describe him, has got the lot: speed, dribbling skills, a powerful shot and the ability to create chances. One of Lille’s youth coaches did not want to go overboard in his praise, but could not resist a stirring comparison: “You have to keep perspective, as he is still very young, but he is like Lionel Messi.”

Lille’s development in the last couple of seasons is all the more remarkable, as it follows the departure of the inspirational Claude Puel, the coach who had transformed them into a truly competitive team, twice guiding unfashionable Lille to qualification for the Champions League during his six-year tenure. When Puel, a protégé of Arsène Wenger, left for champions Lyon in 2008, this could have been a hammer blow to Lille’s prospects, but instead the relatively inexperienced Rudi Garcia, recruited from Le Mans, has maintained the progress.

Famed for his ability to get results on a limited budget, Garcia has added an extra dimension to Puel’s pragmatic, hard-working side, as he let loose the attacking instincts of Les Dogues of war, resulting in Lille twice qualifying for the Europa League and potentially going one step better this season.

"Give yourself a round of applause, Michel"

Nevertheless, the principal driving force behind Lille’s ascent to the top is president Michel Seydoux, a French businessman and film producer, who became the club’s majority shareholder in 2004. Although Lille attained a startling second place in his first full season as president in 2004/05, Seydoux’s approach is the polar opposite of those owners who demand short-term success. He has not been a benefactor in the traditional football club sense of pumping in vast sums of cash and demanding instant results, but has followed the sound business principles of establishing a strategy (“to challenge Lyon in 2012”) with achievable objectives, bringing in good people to support the plan and delivering steadily improving results.

The club has adopted a long-term view, first developing a state-of-the-art training facility at the Domaine de Luchin and then working with the local authority to build a magnificent new 50,000 stadium at the Grand Stade Lille Métropole, reinforced by admirable continuity in the management team. In fact, Lille have only had two managers (Puel and Garcia) in the last nine years, a rare statistic in the uncompromising world of football.

Since Seydoux has taken control of Lille Olympique Sporting Club, often shortened to LOSC, this unheralded side has featured twice in Europe’s flagship competition, the Champions League. They qualified for the first time ever in 2005, repeating the feat the following season, when they reached the knockout stages, before being eliminated by Manchester United in controversial circumstances, as Ryan Giggs scored from a quickly taken free-kick.

Competing at such rarified levels is heady stuff for a club with a budget as relatively low as Lille. Although on the face of it, they have little to complain about, as they sit in fifth place in the French money league with a turnover of €55 million, this is considerably less than Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux and Paris Saint-Germain. In fact, the first two have budgets nearly three times as high (Lyon €146 million, Marseille €143 million), while Bordeaux’s revenue is twice as much. Granted, this sizeable disparity owes a lot to the Champions League money those three clubs received last year, but gate receipts and commercial income are also significantly higher than LOSC.

Given that money usually does buy success in football, as the teams with the highest turnover (and consequently wages) are most likely to win, this only makes the fact that Lille currently lead the league even more praiseworthy. To place that into context, Lens, who have almost exactly the same turnover as Lille with €52 million, are currently struggling in second to last place in the table.

Similarly, Lille are resolutely mid-table in terms of profits and losses, having reported small losses in each of the last two seasons: €1.1 million in 2009/10 and €0.3 million in 2008/09. This stability is not too bad, when you consider that the number of clubs making losses doubled from seven to fourteen last year with aggregate losses in Ligue 1 significantly rising from €24 million to €108 million, though to be fair over half of that came from just two clubs: Lyon €35 million, a big reversal from the previous year’s profit, despite reaching the semi-finals of the Champions League, and Paris Saint-Germain €22 million, continuing their series of poor financial results.

One point that stands out from the P&L league table is that Lille made more profit on player sales (€23 million) than any other French club last year, which is doubly striking, as total profits from player sales in France fell by more than 40% (€90 million) compared to 2008/09. This has been a recurring feature of Lille’s business model with the club making around €80 million from such player trading in the last four seasons. There are two ways of looking at this from a financial perspective. On the one hand, it’s a vindication of Lille’s ability to make money from developing players; on the other hand, it underlines that the club has needed to sell its prize assets in order to compensate for large operating deficits, which average €23 million over the last three seasons.

That said, the DNCG, the organisation responsible for monitoring and overseeing the accounts of football clubs in France, has stated that Lille enjoy a “healthy financial situation” despite the recurring losses at an operating level. Indeed, Lille actually reported profits three years in a row before the last two periods’ small losses (2006 €6.9 million, 2007 €5.1 million and 2008 €6.6 million), though the first two of these seasons were boosted by revenue from the Champions League.

This explains why Lille’s revenue has actually declined since its peak of €68 million in 2006 to €55 million in 2010, as the Europa League is far less lucrative than the Champions League. Like all French clubs, Lille are hugely dependent on television money and actually had the third highest reliance in France last season at 69%, only behind Auxerre and Lorient. At less than €5 million a season, gate receipts are miserably low in comparison to leading clubs in other European leagues, but that’s pretty much the norm in France with only four clubs earning more than €7 million a year, namely the usual suspects: Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux and PSG.

Lille have done much better with TV revenue, earning €38 million, the fourth highest in Ligue 1 last season, comprising €35 million from domestic deals and €3 million from their run in the Europa League.

The domestic TV money is allocated among clubs as a mixture of fixed and variable components. The fixed element comprises 50% of the total media rights and is distributed equally among all Ligue 1 clubs, worth around €12.5 million a season, while the remainder is distributed based on league performance 30% (25% for the current season and 5% for performance over the last five seasons) and the number of times a team is broadcast 20% (15% for the current season and 5% for the last five seasons).

Although this structure is reasonably egalitarian, it does tend to favour the leading clubs, especially the broadcast element. Let’s see how this worked out for Lille last season: their fourth place was worth €11.8 million, compared to the €17.9 million received by champions Marseille. However, because clubs like Marseille and Lyon are shown on television more frequently than the provincials, Lille lose out on the notoriété with Marseille earning more than twice as much: €17.4 million compared to €7.6 million. So, in summary, last year Lille finished just three places behind Marseille in Ligue 1, but received €16.7 million less TV revenue.

However, there is a darker cloud on the horizon. The current television deal, which is worth €668 million a season, runs from 2008 to 2012, but is soon up for re-negotiation. The indications are that it will be renewed for a lower sum, as one of the existing broadcasters, Orange, has decided to withdraw from the bidding process, leaving Canal+ as the only game in town. This is potentially extremely bad news for French clubs, as only Serie A among major European leagues is more reliant on TV revenue, with Reuters estimating that the reduction may be as much as €200 million.

The French deal is currently the third most valuable in Europe, only behind the Premier League €1.2 billion and Serie A €0.9 billion, but ahead of the Bundesliga €412 million (La Liga has individual club deals). Most of the shortfall compared to the Premier League is due to overseas rights, which the English have managed to sell for an incredible 20 times as much as Ligue 1’s €30 million. Indeed, one of the suggestions made by Michel Seydoux, who has been commissioned by his peers to examine the TV issue, is for the league to spread matches over the weekend, including lunchtime kick-offs, to produce higher ratings in the emerging Asian market and address this weakness.

Of course, French clubs can boost their income by participating in the Champions League, which is what helped Lille produce what they described as “exceptional” financial results in 2006 and 2007, when they earned €21 million and €22 million respectively, not including any uplifts in sponsorships. In the latter year, this was split £18 million central TV distributions from UEFA and £4 million gate receipts. Of course, this can be a double-edged sword, as the year afterwards in 2008, Lille’s revenue plunged €24 million (or 38%).

Last year’s tournament was even more rewarding for the French representatives, who each earned an average of €25 million: Bordeaux €30 million, Lyon €29 million and Marseille €17 million. The more observant among you will have noticed that Bordeaux received more money than Lyon, even though they only reached the quarter-finals compared to Les Gones’ semi-final. This is because, as well as participation and performance payments, the clubs receive a share of the TV market pool, which is partly dependent on where a team finished the previous season in its domestic league. Therefore, apart from the natural pride at winning the championship, from the financial angle it would be better for Lille to qualify for the Champions League as winners rather than runners-up.

The Europa League is nowhere near as lucrative as its big brother with Lille €3.1 million and Toulouse €2.2 million earning peanuts (relatively speaking) for their efforts last season. Indeed, if a club battles its way through the seemingly endless series of matches to win the damn thing, it only receives the paltry sum of €6.4 million. Better than a smack in the head, but less than a club earns for simply reaching the group stages of the Champions League, even if it loses all six games.

"Moussa Sow celebrates yet another goal"

As we saw earlier, gate receipts of €4.9 million are incredibly low compared to Lille’s counterparts overseas. For example, Manchester United, the club leading the Premier League, earned €122 million match day revenue last season, which is an amazing 25 times as much as Lille. Another way of looking at this is that United generate €3.6 million a match, so they earn more in just two matches than Lille do in an entire season. Even Hamburg, from a land which is well known for its low ticket prices, earned €49 million – ten times as much.

Of course, Lille are far from unique in France in facing a tough financial challenge with their gate receipts, as amply demonstrated by another statistic: there is not a single French club in the Deloitte Money League top 20 clubs for match day revenue. The nearest are Lyon and Marseille, who both earn around €25 million, but this is still less than clubs like Valencia (19th position) and Werder Bremen (20th position), who earn about €28 million. Gate receipts in Ligue 1 have been on the low side for a while, as stadiums tend to be old, in need of renovation and have limited earnings potential, but worryingly they fell by 8% last season, though that was partly due to the impact of the recession.

Attendances have continued to fall at many clubs this season, though Lille have unsurprisingly bucked the trend following the surge towards the title with their average crowds rising an impressive 9% from 14,940 to 16,286, which represents more than 90% of the capacity of their current temporary ground, the Stadium Lille Métropole, where they moved a few years ago in anticipation of redeveloping their permanent stadium, the Stade Grimonprez-Jooris.

Instead, they have opted for the spectacular new 50,000 capacity Grande Stade Lille Métropole, which will have the highest possible 5 star UEFA rating. Featuring a retractable roof that will allow the ground to be easily converted into an indoor arena that can be used for concerts, exhibitions and other sporting events, this stadium is central to Seydoux’s ambitious plans.

The cost to Lille is limited, as the stadium is being built by the local authority, who will rent it out to the football club. However, all the revenue generated will go into Lille’s coffers, including ancillary activities such as food and beverages, merchandising and other commercial opportunities. Importantly, there will be 7,000 places for corporate hospitality, which the English clubs have demonstrated deliver significantly more bang for your buck.

"Green light for the new stadium"

Like all major investments, there is clearly an element of risk in this project, but the DNCG have no doubts that this is the way forward: “The arrival of a new stadium in 2012 will allow the club to cover its structural operating deficit and so meet its ambitious objective of balancing its books without taking into account transfers.” Assuming no Champions League revenue, that would imply an increase in revenue of €20 million, which would indeed be ambitious, but is not completely unrealistic.

There must be some concern that a leap from an 18,000 ground to a 50,000 stadium will be over-kill, but Lille would be encouraged by achieving near sell-outs in the 80,000 Stade de France, when they have moved home games there in the past, both against Lyon in Ligue 1 and for some Champions League encounters. General Manager Frédéric Paquet said, “We know it won't be easy, but we're expecting gates to average between 37,000 and 40,000,” though he recognised that this was in part dependent on Lille continuing to be successful on the pitch.

The hope for French football is that Euro 2016 will have a similarly beneficial impact on its stadiums as the 2006 World Cup had on grounds in Germany. Numerous clubs, such as Le Mans, Lyon and Le Havre, have initiated new stadium projects, while others like Marseille are looking to refurbish and redevelop their existing grounds.

Lille are also fair to middling when it comes to commercial income with their total of €12 million leaving them eighth highest in Ligue 1, though there is definitely room for improvement. As you might expect, Marseille €46 million and Lyon €43 million once again lead the way, but Bordeaux and PSG also do fairly well here, both earning around €35 million.

Even though the value of shirt sponsorship has significantly increased in France, thanks to the decision to finally allow gambling websites to advertise, the top clubs in Europe are still a long way ahead of French clubs in terms of commercial revenue with Bayern Munich €173 million and the Spanish giants, Real Madrid €151 million and Barcelona €122 million, setting the pace.

Lille’s commercial income actually fell last year from €13.8 million to €12.3 million, presumably due to the harsh economic climate, but things should improve in the future, as they announced two major deals last spring. Key shareholder Isidore Partouche’s casino operator Groupe Partouche, who have been the club’s shirt sponsor since 2003, extended their deal by five years to 2015; while Umbro replaced Canterbury, who went into administration, as the club’s kit supplier in a six-year deal.

Like most football clubs, Lille have struggled to contain their costs, even though they emphasised the importance of doing so in both the 2006 and 2007 accounts. The fact is that expenses were only just higher than revenue five years ago, but shot up as soon as the club qualified for the Champions League and have been rising ever since, even though revenue has not been growing at the same rate. In this way, while revenue rose by a respectable 55% since 2005, costs have significantly outpaced this with 160% growth.

As is always the case, the wage bill is the most important element in Lille’s costs at €49 million, which has resulted in a wages to turnover ratio of 88%, far higher than UEFA’s recommended maximum limit of 70%. Wages have been rapidly growing in the last couple of seasons from €35 million in 2008, though the revenue growth has kept the wages to turnover ratio at the same level, albeit a concerning level.

Traditionally, Lille are a low paying club, which is evidenced to some extent by the fact that they do not have one player in the list of top 20 best paid players in France, which is dominated by Lyon 7, Marseille 5, PSG 4 and Bordeaux 2. Almost unbelievably, at least to this observer, Gabriel Heinze is apparently the best paid player, followed by Yohann Gourcuff and Lucho Gonzalez.

However, Lille now find themselves in an awkward spot. As they are fifth highest in last year’s wages league, they are ahead of most other French clubs, but they are a long way behind Lyon €112 million and Marseille €92 million. In order to catch up with these behemoths and compete on a consistent basis, they will almost certainly need to spend more. As LOSC CFO Reynald Berghe put it, “The huge investment by big clubs forces small clubs to over-spend.” This is indeed what is starting to happen at Lille with the coach Rudi Garcia and five players extending contracts, including Hazard, Mavuba, defenders Mathieu Debuchy and Franck Béria, and goalkeeper Mickaël Landreau, the last of these reportedly doubling his salary.

The tax situation in France does not help either. As the tax rate is very aggressive, football clubs have to pay a higher gross salary than their competitors in other countries to ensure that the net salary is at the same level. That’s bad enough, but recently the government abolished the rule on collective image rights that had previously allowed clubs to claim an exemption on some social charges.

Another factor that potentially could adversely impact Lille is higher bonus charges, the so-called price of success, which cost Marseille €5 million last season, though general manager Paquet has claimed that the club is well equipped to handle this (whatever that means).

What is not beyond dispute is Lille’s ability to make money from player trading. Over the last decade, the club has registered net sales proceeds of €55 million, including €45 million in the last four years alone, which has been absolutely integral to their financial stability. At times, Seydoux has acted with an icy objectivity, for example in 2007 he sold all three of the previous season’s top scorers: Peter Odemwingie, Kader Keita and Mathieu Bodmer.

In many ways, they have a lot in common with Arsenal. First, the club has rarely splashed out large sums, but likes to act astutely in the transfer market. As Paquet explained, “What's important to us in signing players is not the figure, but whether it's the right price. We try to buy well and sell well. Today the biggest transfer fee we have ever paid was for Gervinho, who cost €6 million.” In addition, many players sold for big money leave their best days behind them in northern France, examples being Jean II Makoun, Keita and Bodmer, as is also the case for the north London club (Overmars, Petit, Henry, Vieira, Kolo Toure, etc).

It is impossible to discuss Lille’s transfer policy without examining their relationship with Lyon, which is questionable to some, given that Michel Seydoux’s brother Jérôme is a board member at Les Gones. As is often the case, you can look at this positively or negatively. On the one hand, Lyon have to an extent funded Lille’s progress, paying them €64 million over the last seven years for just five players: Michel Bastos €18 million, Keita €16.8 million, Makoun €14 million, Eric Abidal €8.5 million and Bodmer €6.8 million. On the other hand, it seems strange that Lille would effectively act as a feeder club to one of their principal opponents, also of course giving them their successful coach, Claude Puel.

Even in the last two years, when the volume of transfers has been slashed in France, Lille have still managed to produce profits in the transfer market, mainly due to the sale of Bastos, with only Toulouse and Nice showing higher net surpluses. In stark contrast, the traditional big spenders Lyon, Marseille and PSG have continued to splash the cash. For Lille to be ahead of these clubs in the league, given their parsimonious policy, is highly commendable and a sign of excellent management and indeed coaching.

French clubs’ accounts have been badly hit by the downturn in the transfer market, as they have traditionally balanced their books by selling players. The graph below clearly highlights the magnitude of the problem, as net profits in Ligue 1 have gone down very much in line with lower profits from player sales. There’s an almost perfect correlations with net profits of €25 million dropping to a loss of €114 million, a decline of €139 million, while in the same period profits on player sales decreased from €266 million to €125 million, a decline of €141 million.

Interestingly, the vast majority of that reduction (€102 million) came from sales abroad, as Europe’s leading clubs tightened their purse strings, partly as a result of the economic conditions, partly due to the advent of UEFA’s financial fair play rules, which aim to clamp down on big spending.

This provoked the DNCG to talk of French football being in a “serious financial crisis” in their annual report even quoting Winston Churchill, “if you’re going through hell, keep going.” However, the Ligue 1 club presidents have protested that the official document paints too gloomy a picture, in particular underlining the relatively low level of debt in France compared to other European clubs, notably those in England and Spain. Of course, it’s the unrestrained spending in those leagues that has helped fund French clubs in the past, so they should not complain too much.

Any road, they do have a point, as every club in Ligue 1 has reported net assets, as opposed to the debts at clubs abroad. Lille’s balance sheet is particularly strong with no bank debt and hardly any money owed to other football clubs, resulting in total debts of €23 million, compared to assets of €47 million. That gives them a very healthy debt ratio of 48%, one of only three clubs below 50% along with Auxerre and Lyon.

In the past, clubs have used IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) to raise cash, but this seems unlikely (and unnecessary) for Lille, whose CFO Reynald Berghe said, “An IPO could be an option, but not at this point.” It’s not as if Lyon’s 2007 share offering provides an encouraging example for other French clubs, as the stock price has performed disappointingly ever since.

Having said that, the increase in payroll and higher stadium costs will weigh heavily on Lille’s finances, unless they are boosted by Champions League money. Seydoux has estimated an operating deficit of €30 million, which falls to €25 million once the €5 million transfer of Adil Rami to Valencia that was agreed in the winter is deducted, so there might be pressure to compensate in the standard LOSC manner, i.e. by selling more players.

If Hazard were to be sold, for example, his fee would cover the shortfall on its own, while the other members of Lille’s formidable attacking trident, Gervinho and Sow, might bring in another €25 million. At the moment, Lille are playing a straight bat to such questions with Seydoux arguing, “We have an ambitious policy. We see that in the biggest foreign clubs, the turnover of players each season is very light.” He claims that all the long-term deals “show the club’s ambition”, but equally this could just be a device to increase the selling price if push comes to shove.

"Adil Rami - off to Valencia at the end of the season"

Ultimately, it usually comes down to the player’s desire to stay or go. Gervinho has so far refused to sign a new deal and rumour has it that he will head off to the Premier League in the summer. Hazard is a different case, having extended his contract, but Rudi Garcia has admitted that he could still leave, but only if Lille were to receive a “super offer” for the talented young Belgian. Certainly, there would be no shortage of interest if he became available, though Hazard himself has said, “Real Madrid and Arsenal are the clubs I dreamed of joining as a child.”

Even if some of Lille’s stars were to jump ship, this would not necessarily turn out to be a disaster, as the club has proved highly adept at unearthing unpolished gems and taking them to a higher level, as happened with Sow this season. They have also begun to set their sights higher with Saint-Etienne’s French international Dimitri Payet being mentioned in dispatches as a possible replacement if Gervinho departs.

"Rudi can't fail"

However, much of Lille’s success has been built on their youth academy. As Seydoux explained, “We don't recruit the best players, but we help them grow better than others, because of the great care we bring to nurturing our youngsters.” That policy has been further strengthened by the opening four years ago of a wonderful new training ground at a cost of €20 million at Domaine de Luchin, which, according to France Football, is “more impressive than any other in Europe, including those at Arsenal, Manchester United and Barcelona.” To date, Lille have focused on local youngsters, but Paquet has also spoken of looking at working with regional academies in the future.

Lille’s commitment to youth development will stand them in good stead in the era of UEFA’s financial fair play regulations for two reasons: first, costs incurred for such activities are excluded from the break-even calculation; second, they will be able to enhance profits by later earning useful transfer fees on players developed in-house.

In fact, FFP could be beneficial to clubs like Lille, as similar rules have applied in France for 20 years, so they are very accustomed to operating within such constraints. Lille’s CFO Reynald Berghe is quietly enthusiastic about UEFA’s initiative, “It will help bring about more equality at the European level. It could be positive for French clubs.” Of course, it will also benefit those clubs who generate the most revenue, hence the desire to maximise receipts from ticket sales, which is the main driver for Lille to build a spanking new stadium.

"His name is Rio..."

That’s all future music. In the short term, Lille’s fans will understandably be concentrating on whether they can hang on to their lead at the top of one of Europe’s most competitive leagues and win their first title for 57 years. They have a tricky run-in, but proved their mettle by defeating closest challengers Marseille in the intimidating Stade Vélodrome a couple of months ago.

Lille stand on the cusp of an extraordinary achievement, namely to join Europe’s elite on a fraction of their budget. Off the pitch, they have done remarkably well to cope with a structural deficit, thanks to some skillful “wheeling and dealing” in the transfer market. It has been a triumph of long-range planning, as recognised by another football visionary, Lyon President Jean-Michel Aulas, who three years ago warned his fans, “Our next challenger as France’s biggest club will not be Marseille or Bordeaux, but Lille.” Prophetic words.


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