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Minggu, 11 Agustus 2013

Arsenal - Money Don't Matter 2 Night



Arsenal’s transfer strategy this summer has left the vast majority of their fans perplexed. While the seemingly interminable Luis Suarez saga has grabbed most of the attention, allied with the failure to secure Gonzalo Higuain when the deal appeared done and dusted, the stark reality is that Arsenal have not bought anybody yet, let alone the marquee signing that the supporters crave. Yes, they have acquired the services of French U20 international, Yaya Sanogo, but he arrived on a free transfer from Auxerre in the French second division..

At the same time, there have been many departures from the Emirates, including the likes of Gervinho, Mannone, Arshavin, Djourou, Coquelin, Santos and Chamakh plus a veritable plethora of youth team players. Although most of these individuals did not feature a great deal in the first team last year, leading to the unfortunate “deadwood” label, it’s still a fair amount of experience for the squad to lose with no replacements coming in.

In fairness, Arsenal’s excellent run in the latter stages of last season was pretty encouraging, though the final Champions League spot was only secured in a nerve-jangling final game of the season, when Arsenal beat Newcastle 1-0 away from home (to the apparent astonishment of Lord Sugar, who, quite brilliantly, imagined a non-existent equalising goal from the Toon Army).


"I wanna dance with Koscielny"

Although Arsenal performed creditably, the fact is that they never threatened a challenge in the major competitions and were dumped unceremoniously out of the domestic cups by lower league opposition. Therefore, the need to strengthen was obvious to all and sundry. A couple of injuries to key players would highlight the threadbare nature of the squad, which would then have to rely on youngsters, who may well be talented, but are untested in the heat of battle, pre-season friendlies not being the best indicator.

As INXS once said, it’s enough to mystify me, especially given the bullish comments from Ivan Gazidis in June. Ah, those heady days of (early) summer, when Arsenal’s chief executive boasted, “This year we are beginning to see something we have been planning for some time, which is the escalation in our financial firepower.” He continued, “We have a certain amount of money which we’ve held in reserve. We also have new revenue streams coming on board and all of these things mean we can do some things which would excite you.”

But specifically what could this mean? For example, could Arsenal now pay a £25 million transfer fees and wages of £200,000 for one world class player? Gazidis pulled no punches, “Of course we could do that. We could do more than that.”



And he’s not kidding. When you look at the club’s cash balances – there in black and white in the accounts for all to see – Arsenal’s spending capacity is evident.

As at the end of the 2011/12 season (the latest year when football clubs have published their accounts), Arsenal had an incredible £154 million of cash, which is significantly higher than any of their competitors with Manchester United the closest with £71 million (less than half the Gunners’ cash pile). An even more amazing statistic is that Arsenal have almost as much cash as the rest of the Premier League’s other 19 clubs combined (£181 million).



The story is little different on the continent, where Europe’s leading clubs also retain less cash than Arsenal, preferring to invest most of their available funds into the squad. As might be expected, the financially astute Bayern Munich had £95 million, while, perhaps more surprisingly, Real Madrid had almost as much with £94 million – though both these clubs still held around £60 million less than Arsenal. Barcelona had much less cash at £31 million, while clubs with smaller revenue generation, like Borussia Dortmund and Juventus, were barely in the black with £4 million and £1 million respectively.

Although the club has only really started beating its chest about its financial strength this year, it has been obvious for a while that the club could have spent big. As far as back as 2005, former chief executive Keith Edelman observed, “There are sufficient funds available to the manger for transfers”, before upping the ante a couple of years later, “We have got plenty of financial firepower to make the transfers Arsène wants to make. We had over £70 million of cash at the end of the year and if Arsène wants to spend that money, we will make it available.” Sound familiar?

Gazidis has been singing from the same song sheet as his predecessor ever since his arrival, claiming that “The resources are there. We’ve got a substantial amount of money that we can invest”, before his now infamous comment about the club keeping its “powder dry” for future player investment. Although he made this sound like some sort of grand plan from the club, its cunning appeared to be of the variety that would only have been recognisable to those who appreciated Baldrick’s schemes in Blackadder.



There has been a steady upward trend over the last few years in Arsenal’s cash balances, which have grown from £74 million in 2007 to £154 million in 2012. The figure of £123 million announced at the Interims in November 2012 was lower, but this merely reflects the seasonal nature of cash flows during the year, e.g. the May balance will always be high following the influx of money from season ticket renewals, while November is lower as annual expenses, notably wages, are paid. However, the rising trend can be seen by the fact that November 2012 figure was £8 million higher than the previous year.

However, this does highlight the fact that not all of Arsenal’s cash balance is available for transfers. It’s not quite that simple, due to many factors, including the need to pay those pesky expenses.

Of course, other money will also flow into the club during the season, such as TV distributions and merchandise sales, though not all of the reported revenue is necessarily converted into cash, e.g. all of the £55 million from Nike’s initial seven-year kit supply deal from 2004 to 2011 had been paid by July 2006 (to help with financing the construction of the Emirates Stadium).



The debt incurred for the new stadium continues to have an influence over Arsenal’s strategy. Although Gary Neville, amongst others, may believe that this is no longer an issue, it is clearly a factor with Arsenal’s gross debt standing at £253 million at the end of 2011/12, comprising long-term bonds that represent the “mortgage” on the stadium (£225 million) and the debentures held by supporters (£27 million). In fact, only Manchester United have a higher debt in the Premier League as a result of the Glazer family’s highly leveraged takeover.

Although this has come down significantly from the £411 million peak in 2008, it is still a heavy burden, requiring an annual payment of around £19 million, covering interest and repayment of the principal.



Despite the high interest charges, it is unlikely that Arsenal will pay off the outstanding debt early. The bonds mature between 2029 and 2031, but if the club were to repay them early, then they would have to pay off the present value of all the future cash flows, which is greater than the outstanding debt. In any case, the 2010 accounts clearly stated, “Further significant falls in debt are unlikely in the foreseeable future. The stadium finance bonds have a fixed repayment profile over the next 21 years and we currently expect to make repayments of debt in accordance with that profile.”

Importantly, as part of the bond agreements, Arsenal have to maintain a debt servicing reserve, which was £24 million in the Interims. In plain English, this portion of the cash balance is not available to spend on new players. Similarly, Arsenal also have to maintain a small reserve that is restricted to use for property development, but that is only £1 million.

Speaking of property development, Arsenal’s interims mentioned that they would be getting an additional £20 million of cash from Queensland Road, though this would be “receivable in instalments over a two year period.” There should also be more money from the two remaining “smaller projects” on Hornsey Road and Holloway Road, which could be worth another £20 million (estimate), depending on planning permission.


"We have a rather large German"

The amount of cash available is also influenced by outstanding transfer fees, though this is not a major issue for Arsenal at the moment: in the Interims Arsenal owed other clubs £31.6 million, but were in turn owed £31.4 million by other clubs, so this basically netted out.

In addition, the club has so-called contingent liabilities, where payments are made to a player’s former club based on certain conditions being met, e.g. number of first team appearances, trophies won, international caps, etc. These amounted to £7.8 million in the Interims, but are by no means certain to be paid – that’s why they are described as “contingent”.

Finally, at least in terms of transfer activity, we would have to add in the net funds from the last two windows, but again this is not a particularly large factor. This summer, Arsenal have raised around £10 million from the sales of Gervinho to Roma and Vito Mannone to Sunderland, but they paid out £8 million to Malaga in January for Nacho Monreal, producing a positive net impact of £2 million.

The new £150 million commercial deal with Emirates (shirt sponsorship and stadium naming rights) will have an impact, even though it does not commence until 2014, with talk of up to £30 million being frontloaded. Indeed, Gazidis explicitly stated, “We’ll have additional money this financial year, which will be available to invest in the summer.”

He added, “The deal is all about football, it’s all about giving us the resources to be able to invest in what we put on to the field for our fans.” To which, the response that comes to mind is “actions speak louder than words”.



Gazidis also said, “Our revenues will grow to put us into the top five revenue clubs in the world”, which was somewhat confusing, given that Arsenal have been fifth highest in the Deloitte Money League in four out of the last six years, ever since the move to the Emirates stadium. They were overtaken by Chelsea last season, mainly due to their fellow Londoners’ Champions League triumph, i.e. a direct result of success on the pitch.

In truth, Arsenal have benefited from higher revenues than the vast majority of other clubs for many years. Their £235 million turnover was the third highest in England in 2011/12 and is likely to rise to more than £300 million in two years time. The aforementioned Emirates sponsorship is more than £20 million higher than the current deal, as is the new Puma kit 2014 supply deal (widely reported, though not yet officially confirmed), while the astounding new Premier League 2013/14 TV deal should generate at least £30 million more for a top four club.

In addition, most transfers are funded by stage payments, so Arsenal would not necessarily need to find all the cash upfront – though other clubs, aware of the North Londoners’ resources, may insist on most being paid immediately. In that sense, Arsenal are victims of their own financial success.



Furthermore, Arsenal could always “speculate to accumulate” by taking on some additional short-term borrowing, which should be no problem, given the strength of the balance sheet and future cash flows. I’m not saying that this would be advisable (or even necessary), but it would be a possibility.

So, what is the magic figure Arsenal have as a transfer fund? Given all of the variables described above, it's safest to quote David Bowie, "It ain't easy", when trying to pin this down, but the oft-quoted £70 million is a reasonable estimate. If funds from property development and future commercial deals are also made available, then it could be as high as £100 million.

Arsenal have long been considered the poster child for financial success, consistently reporting large profits. Not only did they register the highest profit before tax (£37 million) in the Premier League in 2011/12, but they have also made an incredible £190 million of profits in the last five years. In fact, the last time that the club made a loss was a decade ago in 2002. This is virtually unparalleled in the cutthroat world of professional football.



However, the headline figures do not tell the whole story, as much of this excellent performance has been down to profits from player sales (e.g. £65 million in 2011/12) and property development (e.g. £13 million in 2010/11). Excluding those once-off factors would mean that Arsenal actually made losses in the last two years: £4 million in 2010/11 and an apparently worrying £31 million in 2011/12.



In fact, the operating profit from the football business has been steadily declining since 2009 with the club actually reporting an operating loss of £16 million last season.



So that explains Arsenal’s reluctance to splash the cash?

Not so fast, big boy, there’s another layer of complexity to add here, as the accounting profit includes non-cash items, such as player amortisation, depreciation and impairment of player values. Without wishing to get overly technical, we need to add these back to the operating profit and then make an adjustment for working capital movements to get the cash profit.

Once we do that, Arsenal’s cash flow from operating activities was an impressive £28 million in 2011/12, a figure that was only bettered by two clubs in the Premier League. The problem is that Arsenal have spent very little of this on improving their squad: that season the net expenditure on player purchases was just £2 million – with only four clubs spending less than the Gunners.



Most of the available funds instead went towards financing the Emirates Stadium: £13 interest and £6 million on debt repayments. A further £9 million was invested in fixed assets for enhancements to Club Level, more “Arsenalisation” of the stadium and new medical facilities and pitches at the London Colney training ground.

Since 2007 Arsenal have generated a very healthy £376 million operating cash flow. Although they had a small negative cash flow of £7 million in 2011/12, this followed many years of positive cash flow, e.g. 2010/11 £33 million, 2009/10 £28 million, 2008/09 £6 million, 2007/08 £19 million and 2006/07 £38 million.

However, it’s instructive how Arsenal have used this spare cash. They have spent £71 million on capital expenditure, £110 million on loan interest and £64 million on net debt repayments. Astonishingly, only 1% (one per cent) of the available cash flow has been spent in the transfer market. Although Arsenal have laid out a fair bit of cash on buying players in the last couple of seasons (over £100 million), this has been more than compensated by big money sales, leaving a negative net spend.



The other notable “use” of cash in that period is, er, nothing, as cash balances have risen by £118 million.

That begs the rather obvious question: why not spend the cash? There’s no one magic answer to this, but let’s take a look at the usual arguments:

(a) Impact of new signings on the wage bill

One point that people often raise when discussing the transfer fund is that it would also have to fund a new signing’s wages, so if the club bought a player for £25 million on a five-year contract at £100,000 a week, that would represent a commitment of £50 million. That is undoubtedly true, but it is a little disingenuous, as it ignores the fact that this could be at least partially offset by the departure of existing players. This is particularly true this summer, when Arsenal have offloaded so many players.



There is no doubt that the rising wage bill has been a cause for concern at Arsenal. Since 2009 wages have grown by 38% to £143 million, while revenue has only increased by 5% in the same period – though this is where the commercial department could be justifiably criticised for their failure to add secondary sponsors. The wage bill will have increased again in 2012/13 following revised contracts for the “Brit Pack” (Wilshere, Walcott, Gibbs, Oxlade-Chamberlain, Ramsey and Jenkinson) to over £150 million.

On the other hand, there will be plenty of room going forward, as the growth in revenue to £300 million implies a sustainable wage bill of £180 million (representing a safe 60% wages to turnover ratio). To place that into context, Chelsea’s current wage bill is £176 million, while Manchester United’s is £162 million, leaving only Manchester City out of sight at £202 million.



However, these clubs might be impacted by the new Premier League regulations, which have restricted the amount of money clubs can spend from the new TV deal on wages. Specifically, clubs whose total wage bill is more than £52 million will only be allowed to increase their wages by £4 million per season for the next three years. However this restriction only applies to the income from TV money, so Arsenal’s additional money from the new sponsorship deals can still be spent on wages.

(b) Cover a potential failure to qualify for the Champions League

Many have speculated that Arsenal may be holding cash back as a “rainy day” fund to cover a revenue shortfall from any failure to qualify for the Champions League. This has been a lucrative source of funds for Arsenal, who earned €31 million in 2012/13 from the TV distribution alone, but Gazidis himself has quashed this theory many times, most recently in June, “The Champions League qualifier in August won’t affect our plans. It’s never been an issue when we’ve discussed with players before and it doesn’t affect our planning.”



(c) Players not available

One of the most fundamental laws of economics is the one relating to supply and demand and that is relevant here. In other words, it does not matter if you have money, if there aren’t any quality players to buy. Gazidis referred to this in his June interview, “It doesn't only require our decision, it requires the player’s decision and other clubs' decisions, so there is a market that has to move not just dependant on one party, but dependant on a number of parties and many of those parties have been in a period of uncertainty.”

That’s perfectly valid, but has not prevented other clubs doing business, e.g. Manchester City have already bought Stevan Jovetic, Fernandinho, Jesus Navas and Alvaro Negredo, while Spurs have acquired Paulinho, Roberto Soldado and Nacer Chadli.

Less justifiable was Wenger’s complaint that “Some clubs acted very early so the choices were reduced”, as if the transfer window were some kind of handicap race and those clubs had been given a head start.


"Cavani - the price is not right"

(d) Valuations are too high

Nobody wants to over-pay, but this is where Arsenal’s cash-rich position should work to their advantage. There’s no point in having more money than most other clubs if you don’t make it work for you. As an analogy, Arsenal may not have quite enough funds to buy in Harrods, but they could comfortably afford to shop in Waitrose, instead of wasting time haggling in Aldi.

Some have argued that Gazidis did Arsenal no favours with his “loadsamoney” speech, but, while this might have weakened the club’s negotiating stance, it is difficult to believe that executives at other clubs were not already aware of the Gunners’ financial position.


"Olivier's Army"

(e) Other clubs willing to spend more

Even if Arsenal are well positioned, some clubs still have more cash to spend. As Gazidis said, “I can’t compete with somebody who has an unlimited budget.” This echoed the thoughts of former chairman Peter Hill-Wood, who lamented, “At a certain level, we can’t compete.”

Fair enough, that’s certainly true, especially with the arrival of Paris Saint-Germain and Monaco on the scene – “more competition coming from France”, as Wenger drily observed. However, that still does not explain why the likes of Manchester United, Liverpool and Tottenham have outspent Arsenal in recent years.



(f) Implications for Financial Fair Play

Under FFFP, UEFA will look at aggregate losses, initially over two years for the first monitoring period in 2013/14 and then over three years, so Arsenal’s recent record of large profits would hold them in good stead, even if they were to temporarily slip into losses before the new revenue streams came on board. In addition, certain costs such as depreciation on fixed assets, stadium investment and youth development can be excluded from the break-even calculation, so this should not be a problem.

In fact, Arsenal hope that UEFA’s FFP regulations will reward their prudent approach, as these aim to force clubs to live within their means, thus restricting the ability of benefactor-funded clubs to spend big on players. Indeed, Gazidis stated that the advent of FFP meant that “football is moving powerfully in our direction.”


"You make me feel (mighty Monreal)"

(g) Lack of a proper transfer structure

As Monaco’s former chief executive, Tor-Kristian Karlsen, noted, when commenting on Manchester City and Tottenham’s transfer activity this summer: “I for one doubt it's a coincidence that the only two teams in the Premier League with genuine sporting directors (or technical directors or directors of football, if you like) are the ones who have appeared the most prepared, structured and with clear strategies in their work in the summer transfer market.”

If there is a modern, coherent transfer structure in place at Arsenal, then it seems remarkably well hidden. There may well be a great deal of activity behind the scenes, but the results speak for themselves.

(h) Will be used to pay dividends to the owner

Although the club’s owner, Stan Kroenke, has no record of taking dividends from his numerous sports clubs, there is still suspicion among some sections of the support that his game plan for Arsenal includes this possibility. When Kroenke was asked at the 2012 Annual General Meeting whether he intended to take dividends out of Arsenal, his response was hardly unequivocal, as he merely said that it was a decision for the board.

He added, “I have never said in any meeting that money wasn't available” and “our goal is to win trophies”, but the feeling remains that he is content with the status quo of fourth place in the Premier League, while topping the unofficial table for cash balances.


"Kroenke - the sound of silence"

(i) Makes it easier to sell the club

Having such a high cash balance obviously strengthens the balance sheet, but the club would arguably fetch a bigger price if it were successful. Moreover, most investors in football teams do not appear to be greatly interested in a financial return. Kroenke himself has said, “The reason I am involved in sport is to win. It's what it's all about. Everything else is a footnote.”

Indeed, if we look at this purely from the financial perspective, there is also the opportunity cost of not investing, as this reduces the chance of success on the pitch. As the presentation of the bond prospectus in 2006 put it, “the move to the Emirates Stadium should increase revenues and the ability to sustain a better playing squad – a virtuous circle.”

Gazidis echoed these thoughts in the summer, “you need the financial platform in order to create the sporting success, but you need the sporting success in order to supply the financial platform as well.”

This is why the bond structure includes a Transfer Proceeds Account, which had the objective of ensuring a high quality playing squad. This states that 70% of net player sales proceeds must be reinvested in players, but (crucially) also “other football assets or prepayment of debt”.



Regardless of how that account has been used, Arsenal’s cautious approach has cost them money. The TV distribution in the Premier League is relatively egalitarian with each place only worth an additional £0.8 million, but there is a significant upside in the Champions League, best seen in the 2011/12 season when Arsenal received €28 million for reaching the last 16, while Chelsea earned €60m for winning the competition.

In addition, a relative lack of success on the pitch cannot have helped Arsenal’s commercial team when they have tried to secure new deals. We already know that the new shirt sponsorship deal contains a number of clauses relating to performance, e.g. if Arsenal were to fail to qualify for the Champions League, the £150 million headline figure (over five years) would be somewhat less.


"Gazidis - brave boys keep their promises"

The other logical result of Arsenal’s many years of reported profits is that they are one of the few Premier League clubs that pay corporation tax: £4.6 million last season (the highest in the league). From a community aspect, this is a noble thing, but it is money that could have helped fund a new striker.

This is not a question of whether Arsenal have under-performed or not. Most neutral observers would agree with Gazidis’ assertion that “We have outperformed our spend, in virtually any metric you can look at, consistently for the last 15 years.” You can agree with that opinion, while still being unhappy that the club has not made the best use of its resources.

Arsenal are by no means a poor side, as they have shown in some encouraging pre-season displays, including a win against Manchester City, but they will find it difficult to maintain any sort of title challenge without strengthening. Obviously, there is still time to make important signings before the transfer window closes, but that’s not really the point, as the season will be well underway before Jim White embarrasses himself on Sky Sports News, including two Champions League qualifiers and the North London derby.


"Oh, Mickey, you're so fine"

No Arsenal supporter in his right mind would want the club to “do a Leeds”, but they are a considerable distance from that nightmare scenario. Equally, nobody should expect the promised big spending to guarantee an end to the recent trophy drought, but it would give the club the best opportunity to compete for honours, especially at a time when their main rivals have all gone through various degrees of management upheaval: nothing ventured, nothing gained.

At the very least, it would provide some substance to Gazidis’ statements that Arsenal are “extraordinarily ambitious” and “ready to compete with any club in the world”. As the well-known Arsenal fan, Spike Lee, once said, it’s time to “Do the right thing.”

Selasa, 02 Oktober 2012

Arsenal - The Song Remains The Same



It has been a mixed start to the season for Arsenal, as promising away performances at champions Manchester City and a rejuvenated Liverpool have been balanced against a disappointing home defeat to Chelsea. However, there is an air of quiet optimism among the fans that Arsène Wenger’s new-look side will be able to mount a challenge once the new players have fully gelled. It certainly feels better than last year when the Gunners were on the wrong end of an 8-2 thrashing by Manchester United.

In fact, Arsenal recovered well after that disastrous start to finish in a creditable third position, securing qualification for the Champions League for a hugely impressive 15 seasons in a row. Even Wenger was moved to describe this feat as a “miracle”, citing the thrilling 5-2 victory over Spurs in the North London derby as the turning point. Nevertheless, it was a close run thing, as Arsenal only made sure of qualifying with a last day victory at West Brom.

The team’s inconsistent performances can be partly attributed to the significant amount of turnover in the playing squad, exacerbated by losing some of the club’s best performers each summer. Last year Cesc Fàbregas returned to his spiritual home at Barcelona, while Samir Nasri moved north to join Manchester City’s project. In the recent transfer window, it was the turn of leading scorer Robin Van Persie to head towards Manchester, though he opted for Old Trafford, while Alex Song joined the long list of Arsenal players transferred to Barcelona.

"Mertesacker - the power of Per-suasion"

Good arguments can be put forward that each of these sales may have made sense individually, e.g. RVP was in the last year of his contract, while the offer for Song was too good to refuse given his tactical indiscipline, but taken together they do give the impression that Arsenal have become a selling club, not overly bothered if their best players leave.

At least Arsenal appeared to have more of a plan this summer, recruiting international replacements before the departures, including the highly talented creative midfielder Santi Cazorla from Malaga, the experienced German forward Lukas Podolski from FC Köln and last season’s top scorer in Ligue 1Olivier Giroud from Montpellier. Furthermore, the return of Jack Wilshere and Abou Diaby after lengthy absences through injury enabled the club to wheel out the tried-and-tested “like a new signing” line.

However, many fans remain baffled that a club of Arsenal’s immense financial resources did not aim higher in the transfer market, such as buying a striker of the calibre of Napoli’s Edinson Cavani or Atlético Madrid’s Radamel Falcao. Of course, either of these would have broken Arsenal’s transfer record by some distance, but the money is clearly available to fund a purchase of this magnitude.

"Cazorla - Spanish eyes"

To the outside world, it appears that Arsenal have paid rather more attention to strengthening their balance sheet, as opposed to the squad, an impression that was reinforced by last week’s announcement of a hefty profit for the 2011/12 season, described by Peter Hill-Wood as “another healthy set of full year results.”

As is the chairman’s style, that was a beautifully understated description of a thumping great profit before tax of £36.6 million, which was up from £14.8 million the previous year. This was split between £34.1 million from the football business (up from £2.2 million in 2010/11) and £2.5 million from property development (down from £12.6 million).


The massive £32 million increase in football profit was mainly due to profit on player sales rising £59 million to an enormous £65 million, largely from Fàbregas and Nasri, though recurring revenue also rose £10 million to £235 million with more than half of the growth coming from commercial operations.

However, this was offset by substantial increases in staff costs of £40 million: wages climbed 15% (£19 million) from £124 million to £143 million; player amortisation surged 70% (£15 million) to £37 million after last summer’s acquisitions; and a £6 million impairment charge was booked to reduce the value of players “deemed to be excluded from the Arsenal squad.”

Net interest charges continued to fall, down to £13.5 million from £14.2 million (£18.2 million in 2009/10).

As anticipated, there was a further slow-down in the property business with turnover falling from £30.3 million to £7.7 million, as the Highbury Square development is now almost entirely sold.


Chief executive Ivan Gazidis was at pains to emphasise the club’s self-sustaining model, claiming that the club “can and will forge its own path to success”, though he must be concerned about the continuing decline in operating profits, which have fallen from a £31 million peak in 2008/09 for the football business. In fact, excluding property development, the club actually reported an operating loss of £18 million last season, compared to the previous year’s £9 million operating profit. This £28 million turnaround was due to operating expenses (£38 million) rising much faster than revenue (£10 million).


Nevertheless, the bottom line is that Arsenal once again made another sizeable profit, even if it was largely on the back of player sales. There is no doubt that the club’s record off the pitch has been superb, especially in the unforgiving world of football, where large losses are frequently the order of the day. In fact, the last time that Arsenal reported a loss was a decade ago in 2002, amply demonstrating its self-financing ethos. The last five years have been particularly impressive, at least financially, with Arsenal accumulating staggering profits of £190 million, an average of £38 million a year.

Arsenal have consistently been one of the most profitable clubs in the world, though they are not quite the only leading club to make money. Both the Spanish giants have recently reported large profits for 2011/12: Barcelona £41 million (€49 million) and Real Madrid £27 million (€32 million). In addition, Bayern Munich have been profitable for 19 consecutive years. Manchester United slipped to a £5 million loss (before tax) last season, dragged down by £50 million of interest charges, though they made a £30 million profit the previous year.


At the other end of the spectrum, clubs operating with a benefactor model reported enormous losses. Manchester City’s £197 million loss in 2010/11 was the largest ever recorded in England, while Juventus, Inter, Chelsea and Milan all registered losses of around £70 million. As Gazidis put it, “we see clubs struggling to keep pace with the financial demands of the modern game.”

That said, the arrival of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations, not to mention the economic difficulties of many of the clubs’ owners, has produced a clear change in behaviour. Milan and Inter have been selling their experienced, more expensive players, while City were relatively restrained in the transfer market (by their own exalted standards) this summer. Even Chelsea’s spending has been on younger players with a future resale value.


So far, so good, but Arsenal’s profits have been very reliant on player sales and (to a lesser extent) property development. In 2011/12, if we exclude the £2.5 million profit from property development and the £65.5 million profit from player sales, the football club would actually have made a sizeable loss of £31.3 million.

No other leading club has been so dependent on player sales as part of its business model. In fact, over the last six years, selling the club’s stars has been responsible for £178 million (or over 90%) of the £195 million total profit. That’s great business, but it makes it very difficult to build a winning team, as Arsenal seem to be perpetually two pieces short of the complete jigsaw.

There’s little sign of this slowing down either, as the sales of Van Persie and Song were made after the 31 May accounting close, so will be included in next year’s accounts, contributing another £37 million of profit.


These “once-off” sales are all well and good, but they have been disguising Arsenal’s increasing operational inefficiency. This can be seen by the decline in cash profits, known as EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxation, Depreciation and Amortisation), which has virtually halved from a peak of £66 million in 2008/09 to £35 million last season. That’s still pretty good for a football club, but, to place it into context, it is less than 40% of the £92 million generated by Manchester United, who also forecast growth to £107-110 million this season.

This may be a tiresome accounting term, but it is important, as it represents the cash available for a club to spend – unless it sells players or increases debt. Assuming no change in overall strategy, this means that Arsenal will continue to sell players unless/until they grow revenue or cut their wage bill.

As Gazidis explained, “The reason we talk about the financial results at all is that it provides the platform for us to be successful on the field.” Given this truism, let’s look at some of the challenges facing Arsenal.

1. How will the club grow revenue?


Looking at the club’s revenue of £235 million, which is the fifth highest in Europe, it is difficult to imagine that this could be an issue, especially as it is only surpassed by Manchester United in England (£331 million in 2010/11, £320 million in 2011/12), while it is way ahead of clubs like Liverpool £184 million, Tottenham £164 million and Manchester City £153 million.

However, there are three problems here: (a) the gap to the top four clubs is vast; (b) Arsenal’s revenue has hardly grown at all in the last few years; (c) other clubs have continued to grow their revenue.

Real Madrid and Barcelona generate around £200 million more revenue than Arsenal. Even though this shortfall would come down if the current exchange rate of 1.25 Euros to the Pound were used instead of the 1.11 prevailing when Deloitte produced their survey, the disparity would still be around £150 million, which makes it difficult to compete.


Although revenue rose £10 million last season to £235 million, this is effectively the only revenue growth since 2009, when revenue was £225 million. The largest increase in this three-year period came from broadcasting, which rose £11 million from £73 million to £85 million in 2012, as a result of centrally negotiated deals for the Premier League and UEFA (for the Champions League), so Arsenal’s board cannot take a great deal of credit for that.

Much was made of commercial revenue rising £5.6 million to £52.5 million, but this is only £4.4 million higher than the £48.1 million received in 2009. In other words, this crucial revenue stream has only grown by a miserable 9% in three years. Even though Gazidis stated in an interview with the club website that commercial partnerships were “well ahead of our five-year plan”, I would suggest that to date there has is not exactly been a scintillating return on investment in the expensive new commercial team.

"Giroud - handsome devil"

The most important revenue stream for Arsenal, match day income, has actually fallen from £100 million to £95 million, despite ticket prices being raised last season.

It is imperative that Arsenal manage to find ways to profitably grow their revenue, as Gazidis acknowledged during the results presentation, “Our activities to increase revenue are important. Increased revenues allow us to be more competitive and to keep pace with the ever present cost pressures in the game.” The club’s Chief Commercial Officer, Tom Fox, re-iterated this, when he described his role as “to build and grow the multiple revenue streams at the club in order to maximise the money available for the board and the manager to spend on the squad.”


Arsenal’s real revenue problem is that while they have struggled to increase their revenue, other leading clubs have continued to grow their business. In the three years since 2009, Real Madrid and Barcelona both grew revenue by around £90 million. Madrid have just announced record-breaking £411 million (€514 million) revenue for 2011/12, while Barcelona are not far behind with £381 million (€476 million).

For English clubs, United’s revenue fell back to £320 million in 2011/12 after their earlier Champions League exit, but still represented growth of £42 million since 2009, while the 2012/13 revenue outlook they provided to analysts was a mighty £350-360 million. The only leading club whose growth was anywhere near as low as Arsenal’s was Chelsea, but their 2011/12 figures will be much higher, due to the Champions League victory and new commercial deals.


Arsenal’s Achilles’ heel from a revenue perspective has been commercial income, which is extremely low for a club of Arsenal’s stature. Even after the 13% increase to £53 million in 2011/12, this still pales into insignificance compared to the likes of Bayern Munich £161 million, Real Madrid £156 million and Barcelona £141 million.


The story is no better in England, as Arsenal’s £53 million is less than half of Manchester United’s £118 million. While Arsenal have barely registered any commercial growth since 2009 (just £4 million), others have steamed ahead, including Manchester City (£41 million growth) and Liverpool (£17 million growth). The discrepancy will be even worse when those two clubs publish their latest accounts, as the 2010/11 figures do not include the increases for new sponsorship deals with Etihad and Warrior respectively.

Arsenal’s problems in this area can be highlighted by a comparison with Manchester United, who admittedly are the commercial benchmark for English clubs. Back in 2007, Arsenal’s commercial income of £42 million was just £14 million lower than United’s £56 million, but since then Arsenal’s revenue has only risen 26% to £53 million, while United’s has rocketed 110% to £118 million, leading to an annual difference of £65 million. Mind the gap, indeed.


Arsenal’s weakness in this area arises from the fact they had to tie themselves into long-term deals to provide security for the stadium financing, which arguably made sense at the time, but recent deals by other clubs have highlighted how much money Arsenal leave on the table every season.

The Emirates deal was worth £90 million, covering 15 years of stadium naming rights (£42 million) running until 2020/21 and 8 years of shirt sponsorship (£48 million) until 2013/14. Following step-ups the shirt sponsorship deal is worth £5.5 million a season, which compares very unfavourably to the amounts earned by the other leading clubs, who have all improved their deals in recent seasons, so Liverpool, Manchester United and (reportedly) Manchester City earn £20 million from Standard Chartered, Aon and Etihad respectively.


In fact, no fewer than eight Premier League clubs now have a more lucrative shirt sponsorship than Arsenal. As well as the usual suspects, Arsenal’s deal is behind Sunderland’s barely credible £20 million deal with Invest in Africa, Tottenham £12.5 million (Aurasma £10 million plus Investec £2.5 million), Newcastle £10 million (Virgin Money) and Aston Villa £8 million deal (Genting).

The news is no better with Arsenal’s kit supplier, where the club signed a 7-year deal with Nike until 2011, which was then extended by three years until 2013/14. This now delivers £8 million a season, compared to the £25 million deal recently announced by Liverpool with Warrior Sports and the £25.4 million paid to Manchester United by Nike.


Gazidis talks a good match, “we continue to be successful in attracting top brands to sign on as commercial partners”, but the reality is that Arsenal have been outpaced in this area. Yes, they have indeed signed some new sponsors, such as Carlsberg, Indesit, Betsson, Bharti Airtel and Malta Guinness, while other like Citroen and Thomas Cook renewed for a higher sum, but there has been little tangible revenue improvement. Furthermore, Manchester United continue to attract more secondary sponsors than Arsenal, including seven since 1 July 2012 alone.

Indeed, much of the commercial revenue growth was down to the overseas tour to Malaysia and China, which is something of a double-edged sword, as it may well have had a detrimental effect on the players’ pre-season preparation.

"Jenkinson - corporal punishment"

More positively, Arsenal will have a fantastic opportunity for what Gazidis calls “a significant uplift in revenue” when the main sponsorship deals are up for renewal at the end of the 2013/14 season. If they could match the £45 million currently received by United and Liverpool for main shirt sponsor and kit supplier, that would imply a £32 million increase in revenue.

Great stuff, but the trouble is that the bar is being continually raised in sponsorship deals, so United have recently announced a truly spectacular deal with Chevrolet. Not only will this rise to an astonishing £45 million ($70 million) in 2014/15, but the sponsor will even pay them £11 million in each of the previous two seasons – while Aon are still the sponsors. Not only that, but United have also persuaded DHL to pay £10 million a season to sponsor their training kit.

In other words, there is no guarantee that Arsenal’s new sponsorship deals will ride over the hill like the seventh cavalry to save them, especially if the brand is damaged by a failure to qualify for the Champions League (though that has not prevented Liverpool from securing superb deals). Gazidis has said that “in terms of the financial impact, it will be as significant a step forward as the stadium was in 2005”, but his commercial team will have to significantly up its game – or Tom Fox will be considered about as effective “in the box” as Franny Jeffers.


Match day income of £95 million is the fourth highest in Europe, only behind Real Madrid, Manchester United and Barcelona, but that makes the club very reliant on the revenue generated in the stadium – “more so than any other club”, as Gazidis stated. Wenger confirmed its importance, “We are very lucky because we have good support and the income of our gates is very high.” Indeed, the £3.3 million that Arsenal generate per match is more than twice the amounts earned by Tottenham and Liverpool.

However, this revenue stream seems to have reached saturation point, as Arsenal continue to register capacity crowds of 60,000 and their ticket prices are among the highest in the world. In fact, match day income was actually higher in 2008/09 at £100 million, largely due to the high number of home games played (or old-fashioned success on the pitch). Furthermore, revenue per match has also fallen from the peak of £3.5 million in 2009/10.


Indeed, after the deeply unpopular 6.5% ticket price rise in 2011/12, most prices were frozen for this season, though 7,000 Club Level members were asked to pay an additional 2%. The media made great play of the cheapest tickets for the match against Chelsea (an A category game) being an obscene £62, though they have been less voluble about the 28% reduction in prices for C category games from £35 to £25.50. In addition, Arsenal have introduced a number of pricing initiatives, e.g. discounting lower-tier tickets to £10 for the Capital One Cup game against Coventry City.

The other issue here is what would happen if Arsenal failed to qualify for the Champions League, even if the inferior Europa League was on offer, as the season ticket includes the first seven cup games from European competition and the FA Cup. The club would surely have to issue credits, potentially leading to a 10-20% reduction in revenue.


The majority of Arsenal’s television revenue comes from the Premier League central distribution with the club receiving £56 million in 2011/12, unchanged from the previous season. Each club gets an equal share of 50% of the domestic rights (£13.8 million) and 100% of the overseas rights (£18.8 million) with the only differences down to merit payments (25% of domestic rights) and facility fees (25% of domestic rights), based on how many times each club is broadcast live. This methodology is very equitable with Arsenal only receiving £4.4 million less than champions Manchester City.


However, the signing of the £3 billion Premier League deal for domestic rights for the 2014-16 three-year cycle, representing an increase of 64%, will “provide clubs with a significant boost to their revenue” per Gazidis. If we assume (conservatively) that overseas rights rise by 40%, that would increase Arsenal’s share by around £30 million (using the same allocation system).

Of course, other English clubs’ revenue would also rise, though lower placed clubs would not receive as much in absolute terms, but this would certainly help Arsenal’s ability to compete with overseas clubs, especially Madrid and Barcelona, who benefit from massive individual deals.

The other major element included in TV revenue is the distribution from the Champions League, which was worth around £24 million (€28 million) to Arsenal in 2011/12. The amount earned depends on a number of factors: (a) performance – a club receives more prize money the further it progresses; (b) the TV (market) pool allocation – half depends on the progress in the competition, half depends on  the finishing position in the previous season’s Premier League; (c) exchange rates – the 2011/12 figure was adversely affected by the Euro’s weakness.


In this way, Chelsea earned more than twice as much last season as Arsenal with €60 million after their triumph in Munich. Interestingly, Manchester United (€35 million) also earned more than Arsenal, despite being eliminated at the group stage, as their share of the market pool was higher after winning the previous season’s Premier League, while Arsenal finished fourth. Potentially, Arsenal could increase their revenue by €30 million if they managed to emulate Chelsea’s success, but, by the same token, they could lose €30 million if they missed out on qualification to Europe’s flagship tournament.

However large the differences are between the English clubs that qualify for the Champions League, it is still much better than the Europa League, where the highest amount earned by an English representative was the €3.5 million that went to Stoke City. Financially, the Champions league is the only game in town, especially now that the prize money for the 2012 to 2015 three-year cycle has increased by 22%.

2. Are expenses out of control?


Last season saw the first operating loss in many years after expenses rose at a much faster rate than revenue. In particular, the wage bill shot up 15% from £124 million to £143 million, despite the sale of Fàbregas and Nasri, two of the highest earners. Part of the increase was presumably due to rushing in the likes of Per Mertesacker, André Santos and Park-Chu Young last summer without enough time for meaningful salary negotiations.

In addition, a once-off charge of £2.2 million was included to top-up the pension provision, while Arsenal’s lack of trophies and commercial growth did not prevent Gazidis’ package rising 24% to £2.15 million (salary £1.366 million, bonus £675,000, pension £100,000).

The explosive wage growth is nothing new. In fact, since 2009 wages have gone up £39 million (38%), while revenue has only grown by £10 million (5%), leading to a significant worsening in the wages to turnover ratio from 46% to 61%. This is by no means terrible (most Premier League teams have a ratio above 70%, while Manchester City notched up 114% in 2010/11), but is of concern, especially as Manchester United have managed to maintain their ratio around 50%. Though not the only reason, this helps to explain why so little has been spent in the transfer market.


The problem is that wages in football resemble a sporting arms race, as other clubs continue to set the agenda, notably Manchester City, who have increased their wage bill from £36 million to £174 million in just four years. Arsenal’s wage bill of £143 million is now the fourth highest in England, behind City, Chelsea £168 million (2011) and Manchester United £162 million (2012).

Arsenal’s performance in regularly finishing third or fourth in the Premier League means they have slightly outperformed expectations based on the wage bill, though Tottenham fans would note that they ran them very close last season with £30 million less wages.

"Wenger - train of thought"

One issue at Arsenal is the equitable wage structure, which means that the top salaries are not enough to attract the world’s best, while fringe players like Sébastien Squillaci and Marouane Chamakh are handsomely rewarded for sitting in the stands. Arsenal’s wage bill is sufficient to sign world-class players, but that would mean reducing the salaries of lesser lights. This has been tacitly admitted by Gazidis: “Can we compete at top salary levels? Yes we can, but we have an ethos at the club - the way Arsène expresses it is that it is not about individual players, it is what happens between them.”

The difficulty is in getting the unwanted players off the payroll at their high wages, hence loans for Nicklas Bendtner, Denilson and Park when the club would have preferred to sell them. However, there are signs that the club is now acting on this with numerous departures this summer and the hard line over contract discussions with Theo Walcott. This is a tricky balancing act for the board: if they extend contracts too early, they risk paying over the odds in wages; if they wait until the last minute, they risk losing the player for nothing on a Bosman.


The other expense impacted by investment in the squad, player amortisation, has also risen significantly from £22 million to £37 million. For those unfamiliar with this concept, amortisation is simply the annual cost of writing-down a player’s purchase price, e.g. Mikel Arteta was signed for £10 million on a 4-year contract with the transfer reflected in the accounts via amortisation, which is booked evenly over the life of his contract, so £2.5 million a year.

Many of the players that have been sold were fully amortised, so amortisation was reduced much by the departures, but it has increased following investment in new players. To give this some perspective, it’s still a lot less than Manchester City (£84 million), but significantly more than previous years.

3. Where has all the money gone?


After so many years of large profits, it is difficult for most supporters to understand where all the money has gone. Gazidis is adamant that it has been spent on football, “We generate revenue and we reinvest all of that revenue in football. We don't pay dividends, the money doesn't come out of the club. All of the money we make is made available to our manager and he has done an unbelievable job in managing that spend.”

That’s sort of true, but the reality is that very little has been spent on bringing in new players with net player registrations of just £4 million in the last six years. Instead, the vast majority has been gone on the new stadium, property and other infrastructure (e.g. enhancements to Club Level, “Arsenalisation” projects, new medical centre) with more planned for development at the Hale End youth academy.


Since 2007 Arsenal have generated a very healthy £376 million operating cash flow, but have spent £71 million on capital expenditure, £110 million on loan interest and £64 million on net debt repayments, while the cash balances have risen by £118 million. Astonishingly, only 1% (one per cent) of the available cash flow has been spent in the transfer market.


Although Arsenal have laid out a fair bit of cash on buying players in the last two seasons (nearly £90 million), this has been more than compensated by big money sales, so their net spend has still been negative. In fact, since they moved to the Emirates stadium, they have made £49 million in the transfer market, where they are the only leading English club to be a net seller.


Of course, Manchester City and Chelsea have been the big spenders in recent years, splashing out £444 million and £235 million respectively since 2006/07. Little wonder that Peter Hill-Wood complained, “At a certain level, we can’t compete.” That said, in the same period, Liverpool, Manchester United and Tottenham have also all spent considerably more than Arsenal.

Following the elimination of the property debt, the club has managed to reduce its gross debt to £253 million (down £5 million from last year), leaving just the long-term bonds that represent the “mortgage” on the Emirates Stadium (£225 million) and the debentures held by supporters (£27 million). Once cash balances of £154 million are deducted, net debt is now only £99 million, which is a significant reduction from the £318 million peak in 2008.


Despite the high interest charges, it is unlikely that Arsenal will pay off the outstanding debt early. The bonds mature between 2029 and 2031, but if the club were to repay them early, then they would have to pay off the present value of all the future cash flows, which is greater than the outstanding debt. In any case, the 2010 accounts clearly stated, “Further significant falls in debt are unlikely in the foreseeable future. The stadium finance bonds have a fixed repayment profile over the next 21 years and we currently expect to make repayments of debt in accordance with that profile.”

4. How much is available to spend?


This question is provoked by Arsenal’s incredibly high cash balances of £154 million, which are significantly higher than any of their competitors with Manchester United the closest with £71 million (down from £151 million in 2011). Of course, not all of this is available to spend for a couple of reasons: (a) the seasonal nature of cash flows during the year, e.g. the May balance will always be high following the influx of money from season ticket renewals, but this money is used to pay annual expenses, including wages; (b) as part of the bond agreements, Arsenal have to maintain a debt servicing reserve, which was £34 million in 2012.

Nevertheless, there is clearly still a large amount of cash available to spend, especially as the cash balance does not include £26 million to come from the Queensland Road property development (though this is only payable in instalments over the next two years) and more (£10 million?) from the two remaining “smaller projects” on Hornsey Road and Holloway Road. It also excludes any money from this summer’s transfer activity with the accounts giving a positive net impact of £11 million.

Although this is probably the figure most fans want to know, it is actually almost impossible to calculate what could be spent in the transfer market for many reasons. For example, most transfers are funded by stage payments, so all the money is not needed upfront. In addition, Arsenal could easily take on some additional debt, given the strength of the balance sheet. Nevertheless, I estimate that Arsenal could safely spend £50-60 million from cash resources.

"Diaby - king of pain"

The other point that people often raise when discussing the transfer fund is that it would also have to fund a new signing’s wages, so if the club bought a player for £25 million on a five-year contract at £100,000 a week, that would represent a commitment of £50 million. That is undoubtedly true, but it is a little disingenuous, as it ignores the fact that this would be at least partially offset by the departure of an existing player, not least because of the limitations imposed by the 25-man squad rule, as highlighted by Wenger himself.

5. Will FFP come to Arsenal’s rescue?

It is no secret that Arsenal hope that UEFA’s FFP regulations will reward their prudent approach, as these aim to force clubs to live within their means, thus restricting the ability of benefactor-funded clubs to spend big on players. Indeed, Gazidis stated that the advent of FFP meant that “football is moving powerfully in our direction”, while the results press release was actually entitled, “Results confirm Arsenal strongly placed to meet UEFA’s new financial rules.”

On top of that, there are discussions at the Premier League to introduce similar rules domestically. However, although there are some signs of clubs modifying their behaviour, Arsenal’s faith in the new system may not work out as planned.


First, there is much leeway in the FFP rules, e.g. clubs are allowed to absorb aggregate losses of €45 million (around £36 million), initially over two years for the first monitoring period in 2013/14 and then over three years, as long as they are willing to cover the deficit by making equity contributions. In addition, certain costs such as depreciation on fixed assets, stadium investment and youth development can be excluded from the break-even calculation.

Furthermore, there is a sliding scale of sanctions for offenders, so it is far from certain that clubs will be excluded from UEFA competitions. This is without considering the threat of a legal challenge from a leading club.

Second, it is evident that FFP will benefit those clubs that have the highest revenue, as they will be able to spend more on their squad, but, as we have seen, other clubs continue to power ahead, so Arsenal are likely to always have a shortfall against some clubs.

"I am Vito Mannone!"

With the new commercial deals in 2014 plus more money from better central TV deals for the Premier League and Champions League, Arsenal should surpass £300 million revenue in two years, but Real Madrid and Barcelona are already around £400 million, while Manchester United are projecting £350-360 million next year.

That said, Arsenal’s revenue will place them in the revenue elite (“the top five clubs in the world with separation from the rest”, said Gazidis), so they will be very handily placed to benefit from FFP, though it is unlikely to act as some kind of magic potion to solve all of their financial issues.

In many ways, Arsenal’s self-sustaining approach has been admirable, though it has often felt like the club has been overly cautious. Gazidis speaks of avoiding “the many examples of clubs across Europe struggling for their very survival after chasing the dream and spending beyond their means”, but Arsenal are a long way from such an awful predicament. As we have seen, Arsenal do face issues around lack of revenue growth and an ever increasing wage bill, but they still have much more room to manoeuvre than most.

"Vermaelen - Tommy, can you hear me?"

The price of Arsenal’s self-sustaining model has been to regularly sell the club’s best players, while charging the highest ticket prices in the country, so this is not quite the financial Utopia that has often been portrayed in the media. For the fans, it must be particularly galling that the club’s two majority shareholders, Stan Kroenke and Alisher Usmanov, are both billionaires, but there is little sign of either making any investment into the squad.

Arsenal’s financial results are undoubtedly impressive and they have done well to consistently finish in the top four, but whether the current strategy is enough to bridge the gap to the leaders and actually win an important trophy is debatable.

The board wastes no opportunity in telling supporters how ambitious the club is, e.g. last month Peter Hill-Wood argued, “We have a pretty good chance of challenging for the Premiership. I don’t see why we cannot win it this year”, but  whether the fans believe that this is credible is another matter, especially when the club does not use all the resources at its disposal.